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INTRODUCTION 
The report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (the 
9/11 Commission Report) strongly recommended increased sharing of information 
between agencies. The recommendations included cooperative relationships and the 
integration of intelligence functions; specifically that "information be shared 
horizontally, across new networks that transcend individual agencies."1 The 
recommendations signify a sharp schism from the traditional Cold War norm where 
“each agency concentrated on its specialized mission, acquiring its own information and 
then sharing it via, formal, finished reports.”2 
Because of its complexity and asymmetry, the war on terror exposes the limitations of 
each governmental agency to acquire the necessary information and carry out its 
mandated mission. In this time of federal deficits and budgetary cuts, perhaps the 
foremost challenge of the government is the appropriation of scarce resources. These 
resources, such as materials, money, support services, and technological knowledge, are 
crucial for the national, state, and local governments to address the challenges of 
terrorism. 
The U.S. Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 20043 emphasizes the 
prevention of terrorism through the sharing of information, and the information-
sharing environment formalizes the establishment of state fusion centers. In Michigan’s 
fusion center – the Michigan Intelligence Operations Center (MIOC) – functional desks 
have been established or proposed. These desks have been created not just because of 
the pressures of sharing crucial agency resources. In view of the need to manage the 
uncertainty of threats and potential terrorist attacks, the creation of these desks 
addresses the recent need of uniting statewide information sharing among local, state, 
and federal agencies and private sector organizations. This activity facilitates the 
collection, analysis, and dissemination of critical information4 relevant not just to 
detecting potential threats but also to the whole gamut of activities for addressing 
terrorism. 
This paper discusses the ongoing stated goal of information sharing amongst the 
Michigan homeland security community by uniting statewide efforts through the 
functional desks in the state’s fusion center. The first section discusses the elements of 
collaboration that encourage agencies to work together in the MIOC. Descriptions of 
three functional desks in the MIOC – Critical Infrastructure/Key Resources, 
Environmental Risk, and Border Security – are then presented. The concluding section 
provides observations on the functional desks as a viable collaborative mechanism for 
information sharing to address the threat of terrorism. 
Rationale for Engaging in Collaboration  
The challenge facing every state is to develop its state fusion center using a systematic 
process that translates national strategy and guidelines into state and local policies that 
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will drive the operations of the fusion center. The ability to strategize nationally, plan 
regionally, and respond locally is the challenge facing all homeland security projects. 
National strategy, as it has evolved, has declared that fusion centers should be all-
hazard, all-crimes and terrorism-driven. It also states that the development of fusion 
centers is a collaborative effort between law enforcement, public safety agencies, and the 
private sector.  
The literature on collaboration states that organizations collaborate because of the 
mutual benefit in achieving their organizational missions and goals. Whatever the 
factors(such as environmental conditions and reduced resources) that may compel 
organizations to collaborate, collaboration occurs when one organization simply has 
resources and  expertise that another organization and sector needs or could benefit 
from (and vice versa). Therefore, we would submit that functional desks in the state’s 
fusion center are collaborative systems, albeit writ small, for working together and 
sharing resources to achieve a common organizational mission.  
The collaborative structure under study has a distinct organizational form. Within an 
organization, its structural design will be affected by any of a number of criteria: 
knowledge and skill (lawyers, engineers); discipline (police, fire, military); time (night 
shift, day shift); clients (inpatients, customers, beneficiaries of insurance policies); or 
place (regional office, federal government).5 Our concept for the structure of functional 
desks, on the other hand, reflects a hybrid arrangement between two or more 
organizations with different functions, but with a common outcome or objective, that 
are co-located under a new organizational structure, such as a fusion center.  
Additionally, due to the specialization of each organization, each member brings to 
the new structure their functions and resources, combining their specialties 
synergistically to achieve the group outcome. The "group outcome" expected must be an 
outcome that none of the contributing agencies could accomplish by working 
independently. In order to have a full information-sharing environment, all of the 
private and public sector agencies which "own" needed information must be included in 
the collaborative process.6 This perspective is much broader than the traditional law 
enforcement and public safety collaboration first proposed by the Fusion Center 
Guidelines. 
The different divisions or sub-units of the fusion centers are called functional desks to 
showcase the hybrid collaboration between organizations that seek a common objective 
and have similar security functions needed to achieve that purpose. Being flexible and 
modular, the functional desks can add more security partners as the occasion demands, 
or each desk could be scaled down and its resources transferred to other desks as 
operational or strategic demands dictate. 
Furthermore, because participating agencies are grouped according to analytical 
functions – for example, focusing on critical infrastructure, environmental risk, and 
border security – this structure is markedly different from the traditional bureaucratic 
alignment by discipline (e.g., National Guard focus on military issues; police talk only to 
police; fire and EMS work their own issues). The current and proposed working and 
structural set-up of the different functional desks reflect a fusion or combination of 
disparate functions from different security partners. Thus, the organizational units 
under study are described as functional desks to capture the collaborative arrangement 
among the various organizations with distinct functions, contributing unique 
capabilities to address terrorism through information sharing. 
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THE FUNCTIONAL DESKS IN THE MICHIGAN INTELLIGENCE 
OPERATIONS CENTER 
In the overall design of the state information sharing environment, the MIOC is 
perceived as the point of convergence for the gathering and collection of threat 
information for the purpose of providing early warning.7 This means that each 
functional desk must identify potential hazards that impact public safety and provide 
timely alerts and warnings through the MIOC to the appropriate security partners. 
Similarly, each functional desk in the MIOC is designed based on perceived needed 
outcomes.8 Michigan homeland security operations has identified the need for the 
fusion of shared information on critical infrastructure networks, environmental risks, 
and international trafficking concerns. As will be seen, each desk exhibits some of the 
common factors of collaboration, including common purpose (organization’s mission 
and goals) and sharing of resources.  
Critical Infrastructure/Key Resources Desk 
The recently established Critical Infrastructure/Key Resources (CI/KR) Desk 
coordinates the collection, analysis, and dissemination of CI/KR information and 
intelligence. The security partners in this desk include state agencies that share a 
common mission of protecting the state’s CI/KR. This mission could be achieved 
through these agencies working together by pooling their resources and skills, as well as 
collaborating with the state’s different CI/KR owners. 
 
Common Organizational Missions and Goals. The CI/KR Desk has been established in 
the MIOC to centralize all of the CI/KR information into one place. This desk in the 
MIOC is currently staffed by analysts from the state’s National Guard and the Michigan 
State Police. They are the two state agencies participating in the homeland security 
initiative pertaining to the protection, among others, of the state’s CI/KR. In the future 
other state public safety agencies with CI/KR related functions will be assigned in the 
MIOC. 
The design of, and the processes for, the CI/KR Desk are drawn from the outline 
contained in the NIPP. According to the NIPP “effective CI/KR protection requires the 
development of partnerships, collaboration, and information sharing between 
government and private sector owners and operators.”9  Additionally, the “Protection 
Program Strategy” of the NIPP contains the risk management framework for the 
protection of critical infrastructure. This protection framework serves to 
“operationalize” the NIPP, and thereby recommends the current missions for the CI/KR 
Desk.  
The decision to co-locate assets and analysts from the State Police and the National 
Guard in the CI/KR Desk is clearly supported by their common organizational missions 
and goals. The state mission of the Michigan National Guard is “to protect the lives and 
property of Michigan citizens during times of natural disasters and to preserve the 
peace, order, and public safety at the direction of the Governor.”10 Among the various 
missions of the National Guard, the mission of antiterrorism/force protection (AT/FP) 
has immediate relevance for state fusion centers. Because of this specialized mission, 
the National Guard has been mandated by the federal government to protect the 
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nation’s critical infrastructure. In most states, the National Guard has been assisting 
state and local authorities, including private owners of critical infrastructures, in the 
analysis and protection of vulnerable assets and facilities through the conduct of its 
buffer zone programs and assistance with design-basis threat.11 
Aside from this specialized expertise, the National Guard also analyzes drug 
information and assists law enforcement agencies in counter-drug operations. The 
information collected in support of the AT/FP and counter-drug missions is securely 
transmitted to analysts and intelligence consumers through the National Guard’s 
information technology resources. National Guard intelligence analysts, trained to the 
same standard as their active-duty counterparts, have the ideal training background to 
assess threats to critical infrastructure. The National Guard also has specialized skills 
and resources in handling weapons of mass destruction, such as chemical, biological, 
radiological, nuclear, and explosive devices. In addition, because of its trained personnel 
and resources, the National Guard renders support to civilian authorities by assisting 
during emergencies and natural disasters, stopping transnational crimes, and providing 
security during special events.  
What is more, the National Guard Bureau12 has indicated that one of the four areas of 
the National Guard Homeland Defense and Civil Support missions is critical 
infrastructure protection through collaborative interagency vulnerability assessments. 
This mission, of course, is absolutely consistent with the National Guard's traditional 
domestic mission and with its inherent anti-terrorism/force protection mission. 
The National Guard’s security partner in the CI/KR Desk is the Michigan State Police. 
The mission of the state police is to “protect public safety while respecting the rights and 
dignity of all persons.” The specific organizational goal of the MSP pertinent to this desk 
is to “provide for homeland security and emergency preparedness and response.”13 In 
addition, one of the guiding principles of the state police’s vision involves collaboration: 
“Enhancing opportunities to collaborate with our partners to develop innovative 
solutions to address statewide public safety issues.”   
The Emergency Management and Homeland Security Division (EMHSD) is the 
specialized division of the state police that is the leader, operationally, on homeland 
security for the state. Its mission is to “foster, promote, and maintain partnerships to 
protect our state and homeland from all hazards.”14 The EMHSD Commander serves as 
the day-to-day leader of homeland security operations, on behalf of the director of state 
police.15 This division ensures the coordination of all homeland security-related actions 
across a broad spectrum of federal, state, local, nongovernmental organizations, and the 
private sector, and advances the effective development and implementation of a state 
homeland security strategy.16 
The recognition of the core mission – protecting CI/KR – is the basis for assigning 
these two agencies to the CI/KR Desk to increase the capacity of that functional desk. 
Considering their individual missions and goals, the common element in the 
organizational purpose of both the National Guard and the MSP is the protection of 
CI/KR from immediate or emerging threat-related events through development, 
integration, and dissemination of threat information. 
 
Sharing of Resources and Expertise. The Fusion Center Guidelines: Developing and 
Sharing Information in a New Era defines the fusion center as “a collaborative effort of 
two or more agencies that provide resources, expertise, and/or information to the center 
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with the goal of maximizing the ability to detect, prevent, apprehend, and respond to 
criminal and terrorism activity.”17 The National Guard and the state police recognize 
that they have a common organizational purpose, and there is a commensurate 
recognition of the need to share resources and expertise to achieve that shared goal. 
Each agency has resources and competencies that the other lacks. The National 
Guard analysts assigned to this desk have training and expertise in conducting and 
analyzing risks and vulnerabilities. Other National Guard resources include equipment 
used in detecting gaps in the security programs of critical infrastructures. The current 
resources of the state police enable it to gather information and intelligence, using not 
just contacts in the law enforcement community where the critical infrastructures are 
located but also from its “boots on the ground” presence throughout the state. Such a 
networked presence in the community facilitates the analytical work of this desk: the 
public calls the state police with tips and leads which are funneled to the MIOC; and law 
enforcement officers, who encounter a lot of suspicious things on the road, can call the 
MIOC for verification of information. Of course, access to other law enforcement 
databases allows state police analysts to countercheck the history and patterns of certain 
groups and individuals under investigation.18 
The obvious expertise of the state police lies in the collection and analysis of law 
enforcement information, while the competency of the National Guard is in intelligence 
analysis and its traditional AT/FP missions. In other words, each agency offers its own 
distinctive competencies, which are “competencies that are very difficult for others to 
replicate and therefore are a source of enduring advantage.”19 As Bryson, Ackermann 
and Eden point out, linking the competencies of two or more organizations can be a 
source of distinctive competence.20 Therefore it is natural for both organizations to 
collaborate in the MIOC, creating a distinctive competency. 
As part of their ongoing collaboration, another resource that both agencies share is 
access to information databases. Federal agencies and the law enforcement community 
provide information-sharing services and programs that support CI/KR protection 
information sharing. The DHS Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN) is a 
national, web-based communications platform that allows the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS), sector-specific agencies, state, local, and tribal government entities, and 
other security partners to obtain, analyze, and share information based on a common 
operating picture of strategic risk and the evolving incident landscape.  
The network is also designed to provide a robust, dynamic information-sharing 
capability that supports both NIPP-related steady-state CI/KR protection and the 
National Response Framework-related incident management activities,21 and to provide 
the information-sharing processes that form the bridge between these two homeland 
security missions.22 The Homeland Security Information Network23 may be used to 
more efficiently share appropriate classified national security information with cleared 
private-sector owners and operators during incidents, times of heightened threat, or on 
as-needed basis.  
The NIPP explains other mechanisms that support CI/KR information. One of these 
mechanisms is the Homeland Infrastructure Threat and Risk Analysis Center 
(HITRAC). It provides tailored risk assessment products for CI/KR sectors, fusing 
consequence and vulnerability information with threat information. The CI/KR Desk 
could learn from the operations of this mechanism to strengthen its information-sharing 
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system and contribute to the whole range of activities in addressing potential threats 
and hazards. 
 
The Private Sector. The private sector is an important member and security partner of 
the CI/KR Desk. After all, a majority of the critical infrastructure in Michigan is owned 
and operated by the private sector. While security representatives of the private sector 
are not detailed in the state’s fusion center on a full-time basis, this desk shares its 
intelligence analysis with its private partners. It forwards cleared intelligence products 
on a "need to know" basis.24 The MIOC, in turn, expects the private sector to collaborate 
with them by sharing information.  
The state police and the state National Guard, with their own distinctive 
competencies, can use the information that the private sector provides and turn it into 
actionable intelligence and other analytical products. Moreover, the CI/KR Desk 
collaborates with the private sector to render effective protection to the state’s critical 
infrastructure, as the analysts may lack the specific knowledge or subject matter 
expertise of sector operations. In contrast, most members of the private sector do not 
have the information or resources to integrate threat information. Effective protection of 
the state’s critical infrastructure requires the sharing of information and resources 
between the state government and the state’s private sectors and among the agency 
partners within this desk. 
Environmental Risk Desk 
The increasing complexity of homeland security issues and the need for the horizontal 
sharing of information at the state level creates challenges for the states in the design of 
potential functional desks. This can be a source of difficulty because the concept of 
security has broadened and become multi-dimensional, yet the fusion center continues 
to be managed from a law enforcement-centric view. The Fusion Center Guidelines 
recognized the paramount role of law enforcement and public safety. These dominant 
concerns, however, which still fall within the penumbra of traditional security, are in 
increasing need of supplementation by non-law enforcement actors due to non-
traditional issues of security such as pandemic illness, food supply-chain disruption,  
multi-drug-resistant strains of bacterial agents, and other environmental risks, all of 
which could be either intentionally or accidentally caused.  
These few examples illustrate the increasing complexity of the emerging security 
challenges in the domestic environment of the nation. While emergency management 
and emergency medical services have responded to these issues and can contribute to 
prevention, a multi-dimensional, non-traditional approach including the full 
complement of state, federal, and local environmental, public health, and agricultural 
agencies are needed to confront such non-traditional security challenges.  
One of the many environmental considerations is the use of medical intelligence in 
the field of public health. Traditionally, public health is a field that did not play a 
primary role in the security of the nation. Even the Public Health Code of Michigan25 
did not focus on potential terrorist threats of a health-related catastrophic level. But 
now the concept of establishing an Environmental Risk Desk highlights the importance 
of public health and epidemiological data that concern health-related threats and 
emergencies. In the event of biological terrorism, for example, this desk could provide 
actionable intelligence on biological terrorism and other medical-related events. If not 
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detected, the potential cost of economic disruption in the state’s commercial areas as a 
result of biological terrorism is tremendous. The efficient release of a biological agent 
through much of a major urban area could potentially cost $750 billion, which includes 
the economic value of human life.26  
Conceptually the proposed Environmental Risk Desk would coordinate the collection, 
analysis, and dissemination of environmental and public health-related data relevant to 
terrorism and public health and welfare. Security partners of this desk would include 
state agencies that share the common organizational purpose of protecting the public’s 
health, whether focused on environmental, workplace, food supply, or water systems. 
These agencies have a common purpose to develop public health and environmental 
intelligence, a goal which could be achieved by sharing their resources and expertise and 
collaborating with the state’s traditional private and public health-care providers. 
 
Common Organizational Missions and Goals. The Homeland Security Presidential 
Directive-21 (HSPD-21) “Public Health and Medical Preparedness,” establishes a 
national strategy to create the level of public health and medical preparedness necessary 
to address a range of possible disasters. Likewise, Homeland Security Presidential 
Directive-7 (HSPD-7) defines agency roles and responsibilities in the protection of 
specific CI/KR sectors. In Michigan, responsibility for public health service and policy 
rests with the Michigan Department of Community Health.27 One of the organizational 
missions of the state’s health department is “to take steps to prevent disease, promote 
wellness, and improve quality of life.”  
This mission is carried out by three units within the department that work together 
and share resources. Foremost is the Office of Public Health Preparedness. This unit is 
charged with protecting the health of Michigan citizens against chemical, biological, and 
radiological threats. The unit also focuses on minimizing the threat to health from 
terrorist acts, accidents, and other incidents.28 The second unit is the Division of 
Communicable Disease. This unit collects and analyzes data on communicable diseases 
and provides support and consultation to local health departments and other health care 
professionals.29  
The third unit is the Division of Environmental Health. This division is the lead unit 
in the state’s health department for response to chemical events. Of the four 
organizational units in this division, the Chemical Terrorism and Emergencies 
Preparedness Section is relevant in carrying out not only the departmental mission but 
also the purpose of the proposed Environmental Risk Desk in the MIOC. This unit 
provides services related to planning, preparedness, and response to chemical events 
that pose a threat to human health including acts of terrorism.30  
The other sector-specific agency that the Environmental Risk Desk must include, 
because of its organizational purpose of protection of the food supply, is the Michigan 
Department of Agriculture. The need for engaging a state’s agricultural department in 
intentional food contamination incidents, albeit with a law enforcement lead, was 
demonstrated by an incident in Oregon in 1984, when followers of the Bhagwan Shree 
Rajneesh contaminated the salad bars of ten restaurants and one supermarket with 
salmonella bacteria; 751 people were affected.31 Working alone, the police took weeks to 
discover the health cause of the incident. 
The mission statement of Michigan’s agricultural department is "to protect, promote 
and preserve the food, agricultural, environmental and economic interests of the people 
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of Michigan."32 Within the department, the Food and Dairy Division, Geagley 
Laboratory, and Emergency Management are the units that carry out the organization’s 
protection mission: the Food and Dairy Division safeguards Michigan's food supply; the 
Geagley Laboratory analyzes food products and beverages for drug residues, pathogens, 
pesticide residues, and toxic substances; and through Emergency Management, the 
agricultural department responds to reportable animal disease outbreaks, chemical 
contamination, accidental nuclear contamination/leaks, or any other emergency 
potentially affecting the food supply.  
Besides these two state agencies, there are three other health and welfare 
organizations considered potential participants to the proposed Environmental Risk 
Desk: (1) the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality through its Laboratory 
Services unit; (2) Michigan Department of Labor and Economic Growth through the 
Michigan Occupational Safety and Health Administration; and (3) the Department of 
Natural Resources. The Michigan State University Animal Diagnostic Laboratory should 
also be included – the potential crossover of certain diseases such as strains of influenza 
from animals to humans mandates the collection and dissemination of information 
through the Environmental Risk Desk. 
These departments, particularly the state’s health and agricultural departments, are 
not traditionally seen as potential security partners by public safety organizations. Albeit 
non-traditional information gatherers, they are vital to the creation of a complete 
common operating picture which encompasses all potential threats and potential 
causative factors. As pointed out by the Guidelines:  
The public safety component can provide fusion centers with information that 
will add value to the intelligence and fusion processes.… Entities within this 
sector represent nontraditional information gatherers and can provide fusion 
centers with both strategic and tactical information ….33 
At any rate, based on the two major organizations discussed above, the Environmental 
Risk Desk compels collaboration. In order for this desk to meet its purpose of detecting 
threats to the environment, food, agricultural, and public health of the state, it must 
function to create collaboration between the above-described agencies. The next section 
discusses how the different agencies share their resources and pool their expertise to 
increase their capacity in order to address environmental and health-related threats. 
 
Sharing of Resources and Expertise. A proposed Environmental Risk Desk in the 
Michigan fusion center may be lead by the Michigan Department of Community Health, 
but it would collaborate with other agencies with the necessary resources and expertise 
to handle an event primarily affecting the public’s health. Based on the nature and 
complexity of an incident, the state’s health department now may notify the 
departments of agriculture, environment, labor, and natural resources, depending on 
the issue – food-related, pesticide-related, water-related, spills and releases, and others. 
A specific example of these agencies working collaboratively might be large-scale 
illness from chemical exposure. Should such an incident occur, the state laboratory 
facilities from the departments of health, environment, agriculture, and labor would be 
used to test for contamination. Hence, the sharing of resources, specifically facilities 
such as laboratories, illustrates the recognized necessity of state health and welfare 
departments collaborating with each other. Obviously, each agency will be collecting 
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and analyzing information which, like pieces to a puzzle, must then be assembled at the 
Environmental Risk Desk. 
It can then be said that because these agencies have a common purpose, they 
capitalize on their individual competencies to achieve that common purpose. They use 
their expertise and technologies to detect signs of potential terrorist threats as it relates 
to health and medical conditions.  
 
Medical Information from Health Care Providers. Aside from medical information that 
comes from the above-stated agencies, the proposed Environmental Risk Desk will also 
rely on the medical information that the health care providers will share. At present 
there are two programs that involve the state health department working with private 
health care providers. One is the Michigan Disease Surveillance System Syndromic 
Surveillance Project. This surveillance project, launched in January 2005, helps the 
state provide timely recognition of an emerging infectious disease or deliberate release 
of a biological agent. The objective of the surveillance project is to rapidly detect unusual 
outbreaks of illness resulting from either naturally occurring or intentional events that 
pose potential public health threats and emergencies.34  
Furthermore, the surveillance project increases the capacity of the state’s health 
department to detect outbreak of diseases in real-time, through collaboration with the 
health care providers. Currently, the department’s server for the project receives 
approximately 2,500 emergent care registrations per day (primarily emergency 
department, some urgent care). Consequently, the health department of the state can 
rapidly detect and track the unusual outbreaks of illness that may be the result of bio-
terrorist attacks.35 
The second cooperative program with private health care providers is the Michigan 
Influenza Sentinel Providers.36 Ninety-three Michigan health-care providers have 
volunteered to participate in the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) U.S. 
Influenza Sentinel Provider Surveillance Network. These clinicians have volunteered to 
provide the CDC and the state public health department with information on patient 
visits due to influenza-like symptoms. In turn, the Bureau of Epidemiology charts the 
data on a weekly basis to determine where and when influenza-like illness activity is 
occurring in the state, similar to the activities of the Syndromic Surveillance Project. In 
addition, participating Sentinel Laboratories report all positive test results. 
Given the existing systems within the health-related state agencies, the proposed 
Environmental Risk Desk offers the opportunity for its participating agencies and 
sectors to initially collaborate through a coordinating partnership. In working towards a 
common purpose, they do not just share information. They also have linked connections 
through the sharing of each agency’s resources such as personnel and facilities, not to 
mention time.  
In the future, it is expected that such a partnership would gradually evolve into a 
collaborative partnership, where formal arrangements would allow representatives from 
each security partner to detail a staff member at the MIOC. Moreover, such future 
linkage and physical presence in the fusion center of the state would enable this desk to 
undertake interdependent and strategic actions on environmental and health-related 
information and intelligence.  
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Border Security Desk 
Unlike the CI/KR Desk, which has the NIPP serving as the blue-print for its operations 
and a long-term relationship between the National Guard and the MSP, and the planned 
Environmental Risk Desk with ongoing surveillance projects that will hopefully serve to 
create the structural embeddedness and formal collaboration between the participating 
agencies, the proposed Border Security Desk faces complex organizational concerns and 
varied partners, issues that demand flexibility in its structure. 
 
Common Organizational Missions and Sharing of Expertise. The proposed Border 
Security Desk should be established by those agencies that have the common purpose of 
securing the state’s international border. Whether the public or private agency mission 
is the prevention of the illegal introduction of humans, cigarettes, or drugs into the 
state, or the agency mission involves regulation of the mode of transportation of 
contraband into the state, or the ownership of those transportation modes, the shared 
focus on the international border begets a common understanding of the security issues. 
Hence they need to share information and, more importantly,  share their experience of 
the potential trends in security issues. 
In this regard, organizations whose core missions concern the identification of 
contraband can collaborate on their shared goal. In fact, some of the initial federal and 
state agencies that may work together in a planned Border Security Desk could be as 
disparate as the Department of Homeland Security’s Customs and Border Protection 
(CBP), and the state’s health and agricultural departments. 
As guardians of the nation’s borders, CBP will be an important federal partner of the 
planned Border Security Desk. Of the five mission statements of CBP, two of them 
pertain to the purpose of the planned Border Security Desk. They are: “We safeguard the 
American homeland at and beyond our borders;” and “We protect the American public 
against terrorists and the instrument of terror.”37 Its mission of securing the nation’s 
border at the ports of entries, with Michigan having three international land ports of 
entries, would allow CBP to filter threats. 
At the state level, one of the state agencies to be included in the planned Border 
Security Desk should be the Department of Community Health. As pointed out, there 
are many complex issues involving the international border that the CBP cannot resolve 
solely with its own resources. An obvious example is the 2003 SARS epidemic when 
health officials in Ontario and Michigan shared information on screening and other 
disease control measures. In a future pandemic, CBP would collaborate with state health 
department’s Bureau of Epidemiology, which has a surveillance section. This section has 
created the position of border health program coordinator for this purpose. 
Another ongoing concern is the danger of agricultural threats or agro-terrorism 
agents being introduced through the state’s ports of entries. Agricultural diseases such 
as avian flu or bovine spongiform encephalopathy could have debilitating effect on the 
state’s economy. Hence, the subject matter expertise and analytical abilities of the state 
agricultural department’s agents38 are also needed for the proposed Border Security 
Desk. 
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Other Partners. One of the challenges for the proposed Border Security Desk is the 
inherent difficulty in ascertaining intelligence on persons or goods attempting to enter 
illegally until the attempt to enter results in apprehension. Through the state and federal 
police agencies, the desk could expand its information capacity on people and goods 
illegally entering the state by collaboration with Canada. Given that Canada’s Security 
Intelligence Service has identified some fifty known terrorist groups, including al-
Qaeda, as having a presence inside Canada’s border,39 representatives of the Canadian 
government could important international security partners of this desk. Collaboration 
through information sharing with CSIS or Ontario Provincial Police could greatly assist 
this desk’s efforts at early detection and warning of potential threats. Project North Star 
with the Ontario Provincial Police could be a template for further collaboration. 
Security partners in the private sector that the planned Border Security Desk could 
collaborate in information sharing could include the waste and trucking and 
transportation industries. The waste and trucking industry demonstrates the complexity 
of border security. Consider that three million containers cross the state’s borders from 
Canada yearly. Many of these containers transport municipal solid waste from Canada 
and enter Michigan by truck at three ports of entry: Port Huron, Detroit, and Sault Ste. 
Marie. Each month, at Port Huron alone, approximately 7,000 to 8,000 containers of 
waste cross the state’s border.40 The state’s efforts to detect potential smuggling of any 
chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, explosive (CBRNE) weapons through 
containers could be greatly aided by collaborating with the waste and trucking industry. 
The complexity of border security should therefore encourage participating agencies 
to initially work together and share resources through a different collaborative 
partnership. The starting arrangement would not be a full-blown collaborative 
undertaking with the attendant governance structures and other formal arrangements, 
including mission and vision statements. That kind of arrangement also demands a 
longer-term process. In her groundbreaking work on collaboration, Barbara Gray points 
out that collaboration represents a longer-term integrated process “through which 
parties who see different aspects of a problem … constructively explore their differences 
... search for solutions that go beyond the limited vision of what is possible” and 
implement those solutions jointly.41 
Instead, the proposed Border Security Desk could initially work on a different 
continuum of collaborative effort. Agencies participating in this desk would have 
interactive contacts or exchange information, or they would conduct ad hoc activities 
between and among themselves to accomplish the shared purpose of detection of 
contraband. The whole point is for the different agencies to begin working together and 
sharing resources, such as exchanging ideas, news, and reports. It is hoped that this 
initial interaction would lay the groundwork for a future collaborative partnership, one 
that has a more formal arrangement where the different security partners of this desk 
detail analysts to the MIOC and collaborate in the detection and analysis of border 
security-related terrorism information. 
THE FUTURE OF COLLABORATIVE, FUNCTIONAL DESKS IN 
FUSION CENTERS 
The foregoing description of the three desks has demonstrated the rationale for the use 
of functional desks not just in detecting potential threats but also for protection, 
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preparedness, response, and mitigation of the consequences of an attack. In addition, 
the different state agencies involved in each functional desk have realized the benefits 
that collaboration can bring to them: by working together and engaging the private 
sector they can accomplish jointly an activity that one agency alone could not achieve. 
Through common organizational missions and purposes, they can gain collaborative 
advantage and expand their pool of expertise by working together and sharing resources 
and information. 
Functional desks result in the economical use of scarce resources and increase the 
capacity of each participating agency. Through collaboration, agencies can leverage their 
limited resources, and agency efforts are not duplicated. In the past, the traditional 
bureaucratic effort of each agency executing its own programs and services resulted in 
the duplication of programs and services. Through the functional desks, however, such 
agency activities are combined with other agencies with the same mission and purpose. 
As a result, their activities are centralized and their results are consistent. Functional 
desks become intelligence teams with varied experience and subject matter expertise, 
providing diverse intelligence insight.  
Likewise, collaboration with the private sector adds needed resources for the MIOC 
when threats are detected regarding that sector. The subject-matter expertise of the 
private sector provides the MIOC with information and even analytical capabilities to 
quickly and comprehensively address the threat to that sector. 
The functional desks concept may not be the panacea to terrorism. But all homeland 
security officials recognize that with scarce resources and high demand for results, 
homeland security spending must be for a system that produces the greatest results for 
the least amount of money. The goal is to economically yet efficiently increase the 
capabilities, production, and efficiency of the state fusion center. 
Bureaucratic pettiness over the "ownership" of assets in the state fusion center is 
avoided when the staff are organized around, and focused on, a specific stated outcome. 
Interdisciplinary rivalries or competition are lessened by structuring multidisciplinary 
teams towards a common objective. In view of budgetary restrictions and limited 
trained personnel, we must pool current agency resources through the creation of 
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